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“Classical” Islamic Legal Theory as Ideology: Nasr Abu Zayd’s Study of al-Shafiʿi’s al-Risala
- Edited by Léon Buskens, Annemarie van Sandwijk
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- Book:
- Islamic Studies in the Twenty-first Century
- Published by:
- Amsterdam University Press
- Published online:
- 12 December 2020
- Print publication:
- 15 January 2017, pp 183-204
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Summary
Introduction
Joseph Schacht opened his classical work on Islamic law in 1950 with the following statement:
The classical theory of Muhammadan law, as developed by the Muhammadan jurisprudents, traces the whole of the legal system to four principles or sources: the Koran, the sunna of the Prophet, that is, his model behaviour, the consensus of the orthodox community, and the method of analogy. The essentials of this theory were created by Shāfi‘ī … [H]e carried it to a degree of competence and mastery which had not been achieved before and was hardly equalled and never surpassed after him. (Schacht 1959, 1)
Obviously, classical theory to Schacht meant Muhammad b. Idris al-Shafiʿi’s (d. 820) theory about the system of four sources, due to his basic interest in the history of legal hadith. He considered it classical, apparently, because to him this theory is unequalled and unsurpassable in mastery and competence. Before exploring whether the central point in al-Shafiʿi's theory was defining the four sources, let me first consider the significance of Schacht’s characterisation of al-Shafiʿi's theory as “classical.” It is pertinent to note that the term “classical” generally refers to Greek and Roman traditions alluding with admiration to perfection, completeness, and beauty in these cultures. Lately, it has also been used to distinguish between modern and ancient cultures and civilisations; antiquity is not necessarily used in a negative sense. However, one is not sure whether Schacht uses the term in the sense of admiration, because in an article about Islamic law written almost within a decade of the book cited above, he employed the term “classicism” as a synonym for fossilisation, decline, and immobility (Schacht 1957, 141). Furthermore, with reference to Islamic law, the attribute “classical” in modern settings may also mean that it is not adaptable to modern needs because in this theory Islamic law is religious and sacred in its source. This perception of classical was probably born in the wake of colonial modernism that defined non-Western cultures, especially legal traditions, in terms of decadence. Those cultures were declining and could not be reformed; they could only be replaced with modern and more advanced legal systems.
6 - Muslim Perspectives on Global Ethics
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- By Muhammad Khalid Masud, Chairing the Council of Islamic Ideology, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad
- Edited by William M. Sullivan, Will Kymlicka, Queen's University, Ontario
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- Book:
- The Globalization of Ethics
- Published online:
- 03 September 2009
- Print publication:
- 23 July 2007, pp 93-116
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Summary
It was probably in 1996 that Professor Riffat Hassan first introduced me to the debate on Global Ethics. The idea was attractive, but I felt reluctant to participate for two reasons. These same two reasons continue to inhibit my enthusiasm for the subject even today. First, I find it problematic to represent Islam or Muslims because no one can speak on behalf of all Muslims or can authoritatively represent Muslims or Islam. This problem is apparent in interfaith dialogue. Dialogues between Muslims and other religious communities falter because while the other religious communities may be represented by their institutional authorities (Sunni) Muslims have no equivalent institutionalized or official religious authority. Muslim religious scholars (Ulama), who are often considered as religious authorities, enjoy no such official position in fact. Various modern organizations, such as Islamic Councils, which also claim to be representatives of Islam, have no official position.
Furthermore, it is not only a question of the absence of institutionalized religious authority, but also one of representation. Genuine representation is not feasible because there is such a wide range of diversity present in religious beliefs and practices among Muslims for example, between the Shi'a and the Sunnis, the two main sects in Islam. There is also such a plurality of opinions among Muslim thinkers and intellectuals on current issues that no one person or group can truly claim to represent the range of Muslim thought and opinion and negotiate on behalf of the community as a monolithic body.